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THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
Spring Term 1991
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
Appellee ))
v. ))
CHARLES CANNER and )
BERNARD BARKER, Appellants )
Crim. No. 90-87
JUDGES' BENCH BRIEF
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Defendants in a criminal case, Charles Canner and Ber-
nard Barker, have appealed their convictions based on rulings
from the district court in the course of their trial and on mo-
tions for judgment of acquittal. Each party is instructed to
brief each of the following questions of law:
1. Whether, on the facts presented in this case, section
3008(d)(3) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) was violated? The government asserts, and the de-
fendants deny, that the government has proven that a viola-
tion occurred.
2. Whether, on the facts presented in this case, either Canner
or Barker, or both, are responsible for conduct alleged to have
violated RCRA section 3008(d)(3)? The government asserts
that both defendants are responsible for the conduct. Canner
alleges that only Barker is responsible for the conduct. Barker
alleges that neither Canner nor Barker is responsible for the
conduct.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Canner has served as Omni Manufacturing Company's
President since its founding in 1982. Omni manufactures the
1
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newest generation of computer technology, known as
hypercomputers. Canner agreed to locate Omni in New Union
City after considerable lobbying from the mayor and gover-
nor, who were seeking to expand the tax base and hoping for
the social benefits a high-technology industry would bring to a
depressed neighborhood. The predictions seem generally to
have proven true, with the payroll swelling from twenty in
1982 to a total of 1200 today, the local crime rate and unem-
ployment rates dropping and property values, and high school
graduation rates improving.
Now forty-five years old, Canner completed his Ph.D. in
applied chemistry at the age of twenty-four. He quickly rose
to prominence in an older, established company before strik-
ing out on his own to found Omni. While at his former com-
pany, he invented several key components of the hypercom-
puter technology and was twice elected president of his
professional society.
Canner has now shifted his intellectual focus from his
own scientific research to managing his new business and en-
joying his role as a leader of the community. Canner is presi-
dent of the New Union City Chamber of Commerce. He is on
the board of directors of New Union City General Hospital, is
Chairman of the New Union Council of the Fine Arts, and is
active in political fundraising.
Though Canner did not attend business school, he is
nonetheless famous in business circles for his entrepreneurial
spirit. He is often quoted for "Canner's Three Command-
ments of Business Success: 1. Pay attention to profits. 2. Pay
still more attention to profits. 3. If you're paying attention to
anything but profits, you probably shouldn't be." He has writ-
ten memos to his staff and contributed to the corporate news-
letter using this motto as his theme.
Bernard Barker, the plant manager, is sixty-four years
old, and less than two years away from his contractual retire-
ment date. He has a high school diploma and some college
credits earned at night through his veteran's benefits. Barker
worked his way up in the chemical industry, starting out as an
enlisted man in the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, then joining a
civilian chemical company as a machine operator. He rose
[Vol. 8
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss2/5
BENCH BRIEF
through the plant hierarchy in that company as crew chief,
shift supervisor, assistant operations manager, and operations
manager. Canner hired Barker in 1987 to join Omni as plant
manager, where he runs all aspects of Omni's New Union City
manufacturing plant. He supervises the total plant work force
of 400 people, and reports directly to Barker.
Only the government offered testimony at trial. The fol-
lowing facts are no longer contested by either defendant.
On June 26, 1989, Edward Egger, a New Union City po-
liceman on routine patrol in the neighborhood of Omni's
plant, noticed an Omni truck leaving the plant. Egger saw the
truck pull off the road onto a grassy shoulder while the driver
seemed to review his paperwork for about two minutes. While
the truck was parked in this position off the road, Egger no-
ticed it was leaking a yellow liquid onto the grass beneath it.
Egger estimates that he saw about two gallons of the liquid
spill from the truck.
He attempted to follow the truck to speak to the driver,
but did not consider the matter an emergency and did not use
his police cruiser's emergency siren or dome lights. Egger lost
sight of the truck in the heavy midday traffic. He noted the
incident in his logbook of running observations, but did not
follow through further.
On June 29 and 30, 1989, the EPA regional office in New
Union City received several citizen complaints about chemical
odors from a discolored patch of ground outside the gate of
the Omni plant. EPA inspector Diane Durden visited the site
and found near the road a three-foot patch of ground in which
the vegetation was dying and the odor of synthetic chemical
was strong. She took a soil sample and sent it to the EPA
laboratory. The laboratory found a high concentration of
DWE. DWE is a hazardous waste within the meaning of
RCRA and is a by- product of Omni's manufacturing
operations.
Durden wrote to Omni to inquire whether it knew any-
thing about the source of the spill. The full text of her letter
1991]
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is reprinted below:
United States Environmental Protection Agency
Region 11
August 2, 1989
Mr. Charles Canner, President
Omni Manufacturing Company
New Union City, New Union
Dear Mr. Canner:
We have detected DWE at a site just outside the street
gate of the Omni manufacturing plant. We are investigating
the source of the DWE.
Do you know its source?
Sincerely,
Diane Durden
Inspector, EPA Region 11
The letter never reached Canner personally. Frank
Formes, his special assistant, opens and screens all Canner's
office mail. Pursuant to Canner's standing instructions,
Formes routes all correspondence concerning certain matters
to Barker. These matters include the plant's environmental
compliance, occupational safety and health compliance, and
civil rights compliance. Canner personally reads mail having
to do with relations with the plant's suppliers and customers,
as well as the plant's production levels. Formes attached a
pre-printed form to Durden's letter, wrote "Barker" in the
"To" line, "Formes/Canner" in the "From" line, and checked
a box labelled "Take appropriate action in accordance with
standing company policies and procedures."
Omni's company procedures manual includes a brief sec-
tion entitled "Environmental Laws," containing in its entirety
the following text: "Environmental laws are important. The
president expects all Omni employees to comply with them at
all times."
Upon receiving Durden's letter, Barker called Adams into
his office. Adams testified at trial that one of the plant's
trucks had been pulled from service for repairs on June 28,
and that one of the repairs needed was the sealing of a leak in
the cargo area. Adams told Barker that Omni trucks periodi-
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cally carry DWE to a recycler a few miles away, and that it
was possible the spill had come from the leaking Omni truck.
Adams remembered that a load of DWE was sent in late June
just before the truck was repaired. However, no driver had re-
ported a spill, Adams did not know whether the leaking truck
or another truck had carried the DWE load, and DWE is also
transported by other firms whose trucks pass by the front gate
of the Omni plant.
Adams offered to interview the driver of the leaking truck
and the service crew to determine whether they knew any-
thing about a possible DWE leak. Barker instructed him not
to. "That's not our job," he said. Adams testified that Barker
went on to give him the following guidance:
You're new to this business, and I'll give you some
advice. Keep your mind on your work. We build
hypercomputers. People like EPA inspectors are always
asking a lot of questions. Answer their questions truth-
fully, but don't volunteer more than that.
In this case we don't know anything for certain.
Maybe there was a spill, maybe there wasn't. Maybe it
was our truck that spilled, maybe it wasn't. If they want
to interview our workers, they can, but it's not our job to
do it for them.
EPA's job is to protect the environment. We'll do our
job and it's up to them to do theirs. If we spent time
chasing down leads for them we'd never make any money.
Now, I want you to call EPA to answer the letter. Be
careful of what you say. Don't lie, but don't volunteer
anything either. Say as little as possible.
Adams telephoned Inspector Durden on August 9. He
told her, "about your letter of August 2: we do not know the
source of the spill. Of course, you can always visit here if you
want to." Adams reported the complete conversation to
Barker, who nodded but said nothing. Inspector Durden testi-
fied that on receiving the telephonic response to her letter,
she wrote a memo to her file summarizing Adams' call. Dur-
den kept the file open but had no leads to pursue.
By coincidence, on August 16, Durden made a presenta-
1991]
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tion on environmental crimes to the local police force, and one
of the people in attendance was Officer Egger. Durden ex-
plained the ease with which hazardous waste can be dumped
improperly and mentioned the DWE spill near the Omni gate
as a recent example. Remembering the incident with the
Omni truck driver, after class Egger explained to Durden
what he had seen.
The next day Durden called Adams, and told him that a
police officer had seen a yellow liquid spill from an Omni
truck. "You know, I thought that might have happened," Ad-
ams said, and explained all that he knew about the repairs to
the truck. He invited Durden to the plant to interview the
driver and service crew and check the records. They found
that the truck had been carrying DWE on June 26 and that
when the service crew repaired the truck on June 28 they no-
ticed dried yellowish splatterings on the underbody, consis-
tent with a leak. The crew put the truck back up on a service
rack, and Durden scraped samples from the underbody.
EPA's laboratory analyzed the samples and found traces of
DWE.
This prosecution resulted. Adams has cooperated with
the government and was not charged. He resigned from Omni
in September 1989.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case involves two criminal convictions under the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), § 3008(d)(3),
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3), the hazardous waste "false state-
ments" provision. Defendants Charles Canner and Bernard
Barker, two senior officials of Omni Manufacturing Company,
appeal their convictions for violating RCRA. The Environ-
mental Protection Agency commenced this prosecution in the
United States District Court for the District of New Union in
the fall of 1989. Canner and Barker were each convicted for
false statements made by a subordinate manager to an EPA
representative during a telephone conversation.
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ISSUE 1: Was a Crime Committed?
The first issue, whether a violation of section 3008(d)(3)
occurred, stems from an oral statement made by Adams, a
former manager of Omni, to an EPA official. This statement
was made during a telephone conversation in which the EPA
was investigating a chemical leak.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency ar-
gues that Adams' failure to report the fact that an Omni truck
was being repaired for leakage constitutes a section 3008(d)(3)
violation. Both defendants assert that section 3008(d)(3) re-
quires that a "report" under section 3008(d)(3) must be a
written report, not oral, and, therefore, Adams' oral "report"
cannot be a violation. Further, the defendants say that Ad-
ams' telephone message was not actually false, since Adams
had no conclusive facts that a leak had occurred. Finally, the
defendants claim the section states that the false information
must be "filed, maintained, or used for purposes of compli-
ance with regulations promulgated . . . under this subtitle."
Because the EPA did not specify what they wanted the infor-
mation for, the defendants claim that there can be no false
statement violation.
ISSUE 2: Who is Responsible for the Crime?
The second issue is whether the "responsible corporate
officer" doctrine can be invoked under RCRA to convict Can-
ner and Barker, Adams' senior officials.
The District Court ruled that Barker's intent to allow Ad-
ams to withhold information from the EPA is not necessary;
he knew what Adams told the EPA, and that is enough for a
conviction. Further, with regard to both Barker and Canner,
the district court reasoned that Congress must have intended
corporate officers to be responsible for the actions of their em-
ployees, even though such a provision is not specified in
RCRA. To hold otherwise would allow corporate executives to
shield themselves from the knowledge of their company's en-
vironmental transgressions.
Barker asserts that the government must prove a higher
threshold than "knowing," since knowledge is presumed in a
1991]
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false statement offense. Further, Barker asserts that the re-
sponsible corporate officer doctrine does not apply in this
case, since the Clean Water Act, § 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c)(6), the Clean Air Act, § 113(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. §
7413(c)(3), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act, § 14(b)(4), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(4), all contain
specific provisions for this doctrine, but RCRA has no such
provisions.
Canner asserts that the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine may apply under RCRA in some instances, but here it
does not apply to him. Canner claims he had no knowledge of
any environmental problem, and knew no specific facts con-
cerning the problem.
The district court denied Canner's and Barker's motions
for judgments of acquittal. With respect to the issue of
whether a violation has occurred, the district court ruled that
Adams' telephone call to the EPA was in fact a "report," al-
beit an oral one. Further, the fact that he knew a truck had
been repaired for leakage and failed to report it constituted a
section 3008(d)(3) violation. Finally, it is irrelevant that EPA
did not specify why it wanted the information from Omni; it
suffices that EPA wanted the information for its environmen-
tal program.
Both Canner and Barker appealed their convictions to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit to
review both issues. The petitions were granted. Both Canner
and Barker assert that no crime has been committed under
RCRA's terms in section 3008(d)(3). Canner further asserts
that even if a crime was committed, Barker, not Canner, is
responsible. Barker asserts that neither he nor Canner is re-
sponsible, even if a crime occurred.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
INTRODUCTION
The first question to address is whether Adams' actions
constituted a violation. This must be established before there
can be any allegation that Canner or Barker is liable for the
violation.
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Once a violation is established, Barker's actions should
next be analyzed, since they are most closely associated with
Adams' actions. Barker's liability can be approached either on
a direct participation or vicarious liability basis. Canner's ac-
tions and liability under the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine should be considered last.
OUTLINE OF THE ISSUES
I. WHETHER RCRA § 3008(d)(3) WAS VIOLATED?
A. Overview of issue one
B. Does RCRA even apply to this case?
1. Overview
2. Definitions
a. Solid waste
b. Hazardous waste
c. Discarded material
3. Case law: American Mining Congress
4. Conclusion
C. Was Adams' statement false under RCRA § 3008?
1. Overview
2. A material statement
3. Knowingly made
4. In a report
a. Whether plain meaning should be used?
b. Legislative history of section 3008(d)(3)
c. Narrow versus liberal interpretation
d. Noscitur a sociis
e. Lenity
f. In pari materia
5. For purposes of compliance with EPA investiga-
tions
II. WHETHER BARKER, CANNER, OR BOTH ARE
RESPONSIBLE?
A. Whether Barker is responsible for the violation?
1. Overview
2. Degree of knowledge required for Barker to be
liable
B. Whether Canner is responsible for the violation?
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1. Overview
2. Responsible corporate officer doctrine
a. Can Canner delegate his responsibility?
b. Can Canner avoid liability by willful igno-
rance?
ISSUES
I. WHETHER RCRA § 3008(d)(3) WAS VIOLATED?
A. Overview of issue one
There is a pervasive, yet subtle issue that should be ad-
dressed first, and that is whether RCRA even applies to this
case. Note that the hazardous material was headed for a re-
cycler, which raises the question of whether the material was
yet a "waste" within the meaning of RCRA.
The next task is to place the subject actions into the con-
text of section 3008(d)(3). Adams' oral statement is not de-
monstrably false, but it may omit material information. The
questions under section 3008(d)(3) then are:
(1) Did Adams knowingly omit information? In answering
this question, the issue is not whether Adams told the truth,
but whether he told the whole truth.
(2) Was the omission of information a material omission?
(3) Was Adams' omission made in a report, even though
it was oral and not written?
(4) Was the report once used for purposes of compliance
with RCRA regulations?
The first two questions are answered by a combination of
analyzing the facts of the case and case law defining "know-
ing" and "material." RCRA cases on "knowing" are discussed
below.
"Material" omission cases must be examined under the
analogous 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which addresses general criminal
false statements. In 18 U.S.C. § 1001, Congress distinguishes
mail and telephone fraud.
The third question requires an analysis of whether "re-
port," that the only listed item the telephone call could fall
into, encompasses both oral and written reports. This requires
[Vol. 8
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statutory interpretation, starting with the plain meaning of
the statutory provision, the statutory context of the provision,
and the legislative history.
Arguments for interpreting the statute to cover oral re-
ports should center on four major points:
(1) Whether a "report" is generally understood to include
both oral and written statements (Government's position), or
does the fact that the section ends with "or other documents"
imply that all the items on the list are written (Defendants'
position).
(2) Whether remedial and criminal statutes should be lib-
erally (Government) or narrowly (Defendants) construed.
(3) Whether the legislative intent of section 3008(d)(3),
aimed at expanding its scope to cover material omissions and
failure to file, implies that Congress intended to include oral
reports as well (Government) or whether the expansion, aimed
at report filing, shows an intent to restrict §3008 to written
reports (Defendants).
(4) Whether analogous U.S.C. sections (18 U.S.C. §§ 1001,
1341, and 1343), which clearly distinguish between oral and
written reports, can be applied to this section in order to show
that Congress knows how to distinguish between oral and
written reports when it wants to (Defendants) or whether
these sections do not apply to this statute (Government).
The final question to be addressed is whether the request
for information falls within the "purposes of compliance"
scope of section 3008(d)(3). The government is authorized
under section 3007 to require information on hazardous
wastes from anyone who handles them. If the wastes are not
hazardous, then neither section 3007 nor section 3008(d)(3)
applies. If they are hazardous, the government's inquiry ap-
pears within the scope of seeking information on compliance
with RCRA.
B. Does RCRA even apply to this case?
1. Overview
The issue that should be first addressed is whether RCRA
even applies to this case. RCRA jurisdiction applies only to
1991]
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waste material. Since the DWE was being taken to a recycler,
there is a technical question of whether the material can be
defined as a "waste" within the meaning of RCRA. If the gov-
ernment fails to demonstrate that the DWE was a "waste" for
RCRA purposes, then this court lacks proper subject-matter
jurisdiction.
2. Definitions
a. Solid waste
Hazardous wastes are a subset of solid wastes. RCRA §
1004(5); 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(ii). The term "solid waste" is
defined as any garbage, refuse, sludge,... and other discarded
material .... ." RCRA § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). Under
RCRA jurisdiction, generators of hazardous wastes are re-
quired to assure that their hazardous wastes are disposed of in
properly permitted facilities, to make various reports, and to
manifest their shipments. RCRA § 3001; 40 C.F.R. Part 262.
b. Hazardous waste
The hazardous material, DWE, was headed for a recycler
when it leaked from the truck. "Recycled" is defined in 40
C.F.R § 261.2(e). A question exists whether this material is
actually a RCRA regulated waste. The term "hazardous
waste" is defined under RCRA as a "solid waste, or combina-
tion of solid wastes, which . . . may . . . pose a substantial
present or potential hazard to human health." RCRA §
1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).
c. Discarded material
RCRA does not define the term "discarded material."
The question exists as to whether recycled materials are cov-
ered by RCRA as discarded material. EPA regulations at-
tempt to rectify this issue. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1989). These
regulations define "solid waste" as any material that is dis-
carded. "Discarded" is further defined as: "1) abandoned ma-
terial; 2) recycled material (or accumulated, stored, or treated
before recycling) if applied to or placed on land in a manner
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constituting disposal; or 3) inherently wastelike." Id. § 261.2.
3. Case law: American Mining Congress
Case law is sparse on this issue. In American Mining
Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court
exempted certain recycled materials from RCRA. It held that
"EPA need not regulate 'spent' materials that are recycled
and reused in an on-going manufacturing process or industrial
process." Id.
4. Conclusion
There is not enough factual information to identify how
the DWE is to be recycled. Without this information a defi-
nite ruling on whether RCRA even applies to this recycled
material cannot be made. Although much time should not be
devoted to it, the argument is nevertheless a viable one for the
defendants to raise. The government can overcome a contrary
argument by arguing that the leaked DWE was literally dis-
posed of, albeit unintentionally.
C. Was Adams' statement false under RCRA § 3008?
1. Overview
The basis of the government's charge of a false statement
offense is the telephone call made by Adams, the former facil-
ities manager at the plant. The call was in response to a letter
from an EPA inspector, Durden, seeking information on
whether the plant knew anything about the source of the spill
that occurred outside the plant. The government alleges that
this call was a false statement made in violation of RCRA §
3008(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3).
The essential elements for a false statement under §
3008(d)(3) are:
(1) Did Adams knowingly omit information?
(2) Was the omission of information a material omission?
(3) Was Adams' omission made in a report?
(4) Was the report once used for purposes of compliance
with RCRA regulations?
1991]
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2. A material statement
In RCRA § 3008(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(3), the term "mate-
rial" modifies both information (knowingly omits material in-
formation) and false statements (false material statements or
representation). In reporting on the Solid Waste Disposal Act
Amendments of 1980 the Conference Committee stated:
The amendment to this subsection would clarify existing
law by providing that only false "material" statements
under the Act are covered by the criminal provision. Ex-
isting law does not specify that such statements or repre-
sentations must be material. Federal criminal law gener-
ally reaches only those false statements that have a
material bearing on the activity or program to which they
relate.
S. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5019, 5036.
The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
added "omission of material information" to section
3008(d)(3). In reporting on the amendments, the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, to whom the bill was referred,
noted that "only material omissions, i.e. omissions which will
have a tendency to influence Agency action, are included, en-
suring against the application of this section to incidental or
insignificant violations." H.R. Rep. No. 198, pt.1, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5576, 5614.
There has been no case law generated on the term "mate-
rial" as used in RCRA § 3008(d)(3). However, definitions exist
under the general false statement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
The accepted test of materiality is "whether the false state-
ment has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of
influencing, the decisions of the tribunal in making a determi-
nation required to be made, or was... one that could effect or
influence the exercise of a governmental function." United
States v. Quirk, 167 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1958). See also
United States v. Popow, 821 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1987)(defend-
ant's giving of fictitious identification to customs inspector
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was "material" within meaning of statute as identification had
a capability of influencing inspector's decision); United States
v. Chandler, 752 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1985) (falsified insurance
claim letter was capable of influencing IRS decision).
It has also been held that the question of materiality is
one of law; not an element of the offense that must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt but a "judicially imposed limita-
tion to insure the reasonable application of the statute."
United States v. Chandler, 752 F.2d at 1151 (quoting United
States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 86, 87 (1983)). The purpose of the materiality require-
ment was to "exclude trivial falsehoods from the purview of
the statute." United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 170-71 (5th
Cir. 1975).
3. Knowingly made
This sub-issue is more significant as it pertains to the de-
gree of knowledge required of Barker and Canner for their
criminal liability. Since Adams is not a party to this case, the
"knowing" element of section 3008(d)(3) is reserved for the
second issue of the case.
4. In a report
a. Whether plain meaning should be used
The question for the court is whether the telephone call is
to be considered a report as identified in section 3008(d)(3).
This statute provides criminal penalties for "[a]ny person who
... knowingly omits material information or makes any false
material statement or representation in any application, label,
manifest, record, report, permit, or other document filed,
maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with regula-
tions promulgated . . . under this subchapter." RCRA §
3008(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3).
In the inquiry of whether a telephone call or other oral
report is included in the statute, courts give deference to the
agency's interpretation of the statute. Chevron v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
In general statutory analysis, it is appropriate to first look
1991]
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at the statute's plain language and then, if necessary, at its
legislative intent. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 110 S.
Ct. 929, 934 (1990); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.,
741 F.2d 662, 665 (1984). The words of a statute should be
interpreted according to their common meanings. Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, § 47.28 (4th ed. 1984); Perrin v.
United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
Black's Law Dictionary, 1169 (5th Ed. 1979), defines re-
port as "[a]n official or formal statement of facts or proceed-
ings. To find an account of, to relate, to tell, to convey or dis-
seminate information." By this definition, a report can be
either an oral or written dissemination of information, which
supports the government's position.
b. Legislative history of section 3008(d)(3)
After reviewing the plain meaning, a look at the legisla-
tive history of RCRA to determine congressional intent is in
order. The conference committee report which accompanied
H.R. 14,496 provided that, "the use of criminal penalties are
sufficiently narrow in that they apply only to those who know-
ingly transport hazardous waste to a facility which does not
have a permit, the actual disposal of hazardous wastes without
a permit, or the falsification of documents . . . ." H.R. Rep.
No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 31, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6238, 6269. In reviewing the
1984 amendments to RCRA, the House Energy and Com-
merce committee made the following comment:
RCRA provides criminal penalties for submitting false in-
formation in documents required to be filed under the
Act. However, the statute presently does not specifically
address material omissions or the failure to file required
reports. These actions could obviously cause grave harm
to regulatory process .... These amendments are pro-
posed to clarify the criminal penalties that pertain to this
conduct.
H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 54, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5576, 5613-
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14. The above statements support the defendants' argument
that section 3008(d)(3) focuses only on written documents,
and not oral.
c. Narrow versus liberal interpretation
However, a contrary argument by the government can be
made that the legislative intent was not meant to be so nar-
row. The RCRA conference committee report cited above also
provided that "[t]he Committee justification for the penalties
section is to permit a broad variety of mechanisms so as to
stop the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes." H.R. Rep. No.
1491 at 31, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6238, 6269.
Also supporting the government's position is United
States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (1984). Here
the court rejected a narrow interpretation of the word "per-
son" as used in RCRA, basing part of its ruling on congres-
sional intent. The court held that Congress, by amending the
statute twice to broaden its scope, delivered a strong signal of
its concern about the seriousness of the conduct to be prohib-
ited. Id. at 667. Further, the court noted that it is well estab-
lished that criminal penalties attached to public health stat-
utes should be construed in a manner which best effectuates
the regulatory purpose. Id. at 666.
The government in this case may argue that legislative
history and case law interpret RCRA as a public welfare stat-
ute, enacted to address and control the serious national prob-
lem of hazardous waste disposal. See Johnson & Towers at
666 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 11,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238). As
such, a narrow reading excluding oral reports from section
3008(d)(3) would defeat the regulatory purpose of protecting
the public welfare by stopping the illegal disposal of hazard-
ous wastes.
d. Noscitur a sociis
"If the legislative intent or meaning of a statute is not
clear, the meaning of doubtful words may be determined by
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reference to their relationship with other associated words
and phrases." Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 47.16
(4th ed. 1984). This is the doctrine known as noscitur a sociis.
It is to serve as another guide to legislative intent. It is ap-
plied when two or more words are grouped together, and ordi-
narily have a similar meaning, but are not equally comprehen-
sive. The general words will be limited and qualified by the
special words. Id.; United States v. Sumitamo Shoji New
York, Inc., 534 F.2d 320, 322 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (the intent of a
specific word may become clear by reference to the other
words associated with it in the statute).
In United States v. Iannone, 610 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir.
1979), the court of appeals sought to interpret narrowly sec-
tion 208(g)(2) of the Department of Energy ("DOE") Organi-
zation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7138 (Supp. I 1977). With wording
nearly identical to section 3008(d)(3) of RCRA, this section
authorizes the Inspector General of the DOE to subpoena "all
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts,
papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary."
The court of appeals held that "in short, the language is di-
rected at documentary evidence, as contrasted to oral testi-
mony." Iannone, 610 F.2d at 945.
Applying this holding to RCRA § 3008(d)(3), a report
may be considered the general term in the section, which
should be restricted by the specific phrase "and other docu-
ments." The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, then, is of value to
the defendants in arguing that oral reports should be ex-
cluded from section 3008(d)(3).
e. Lenity
If, after reviewing the language and legislative intent and
after applying various statutory interpretation devices, the is-
sue as to what Congress intended is still uncertain, then the
rule of lenity may apply. This canon of statutory construction
provides that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes .. .be resolved in favor of lenity." United States v.
Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 77 (1984)(quoting Rewis v. United
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)). Under this canon, doubt
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over the application of the word "report" must be construed
in favor of the defendant. See United States v. Adamo-
Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. 275 (1978)(interpretation of an ambig-
uous term under the CAA criminal statute to be interpreted
in favor of the defendant).
f. In pari materia
A review of other closely related statutes may be of assis-
tance to the government in this case. The doctrine of in pari
materia pertains to statutes relating to the same person or
thing or having a common purpose. Black's Law Dictionary
711 (5th Ed. 1979); Sutherland, Statutory Construction at §
51.02.
The federal false statement offense statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1001, provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any de-
partment or agency of the United States knowingly and
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fic-
titious or fraudulent statements or representations, or
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the
same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ment or entry, shall be fined ....
18 U.S.C. § 1001.
The fifth Circuit has held that this statute covers both
oral and written statements. United States v. Massey, 550
F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1977). In Massey, the defendant was
charged with making a false statement after he contacted the
FBI and told them that he was involved in a conspiracy to
assassinate the President. The defendant claimed that a false
statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 could only be a written
statement. In interpreting this statute, the court held that a
statement or representation is oral and a writing or document
is written. Id. at 305.
However, defendants can argue that the two statutes are
separate and that Congress' language in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is
much broader and more inclusive. If Congress wanted RCRA
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§ 3008(d)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to be interpreted the same
they could have used similar language. Therefore, the two
statutes are distinguishable, and the meaning of one cannot
be interpreted as being identical to the meaning of the other.
Defendants should argue that if the government wanted to in-
clude oral reports in its charge, they should sue under 18
U.S.C. § 1001.
5. For purposes of compliance with EPA investi-
gations
The final question to address is whether the EPA's re-
quest for information falls within the "purposes of compli-
ance" scope of section 3008(d)(3). RCRA § 3007 authorizes
the government to require information on hazardous wastes
from anyone who handles them. Specifically, this section
states:
For purposes of developing or assisting in the develop-
ment of any regulation or enforcing the provisions of this
chapter, any person who generates, stores, treats, trans-
ports, disposes of, or otherwise handles . . . shall, upon
request of any officer, employee or representative of the
EPA .... or any representative of a State having an au-
thorized hazardous waste program, furnish information
relating to such wastes and permit such person at all rea-
sonable times to have access to, and to copy all records
relating to such wastes.
RCRA § 3007.
From this section a duty exists to relate information to
the EPA upon request. Whether this duty was breached de-
pends on whether the information given by Adams was con-
sidered to be "false material information."
Defendants argue that they have complied with section
3007 by inviting the EPA to visit the plant to investigate and
inspect it. They claim that in responding to Durden's letter
they have not reported any false information.
[Vol. 8
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss2/5
BENCH BRIEF
II. WHETHER BARKER, CANNER, OR BOTH ARE
RESPONSIBLE?
Plainly stated, the issue of Barker's (and Canner's) liabil-
ity is whether either defendant intended and anticipated what
Adams would say to the EPA, or whether it was enough that
the defendants had laid down general guidance to be less than
completely forthright ("Don't lie, but don't volunteer any-
thing either"). The government should argue, and the defend-
ants should refute, that the defendants' extra involvement in
knowing about the conversation (between Adams and Inspec-
tor Durden) after it occurred is enough to tip the balance.
A. Whether Barker is responsible for the violation?
1. Overview
Barker can be approached either as a direct participant in
Adams' actions or as a responsible officer because of his posi-
tion in the chain of the corporate hierarchy. The second ap-
proach depends on whether the "responsible corporate officer"
doctrine applies to section 3008(d)(3) of RCRA.
The conversation between Barker and Adams is purpose-
fully ambiguous, so that reasonable arguments can be made to
support different levels of knowledge by Barker. Concerning
Barker's instructions (actual or implied), See U.S. v. Greer,
850 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1988). General vicarious culpability
probably deserves treatment here, as discussed in 18 U.S.C. §
2. Section 2 explicitly establishes the principle of punishment
for offenses against the United States. Barker may be liable
for counseling, commanding, or inducing a crime against the
United States under section 2(a), or he may be liable for will-
fully causing an act to be done against the United States
under section 2(b). The responsible corporate officer doctrine
is reserved for the discussion on Canner's liability in this doc-
ument, although the argument itself can and should be
brought up by both parties.
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2. Degree of knowledge required for Barker to be
liable
The degree of knowledge required under RCRA § 3008 to
inculpate Barker is the key issue for Barker's defense. On ap-
peal, Barker asserts that the government must prove more
than that he "knew" of the false statement. (R. 6). He claims
that the government must prove a higher standard, that he
"willed" or "intended," the false statement. (R. 6). For its
part, in opposition to Barker, the government urges a literal
interpretation of "knowing." It suggests that Congress knows
how to use stronger language when it wants to. (R. 6). (De-
fendants may wish to note an inconsistency in the govern-
ment's argument: note that now the government is attempting
to interpret the statute narrowly, whereas the government
seeks a broad interpretation of the definition of "report" (i.e.
includes oral and written material)).
In a letter to Congress, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
noted that criminal penalties are often more appropriate
where there is a "clear, knowing disregard for the law." H.R.
Rep. No. 1491 at 84, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6321. These statements support an argu-
ment that Congress intended a broader mental element in the
statute than just knowledge that the statements were false.
However, in the 1980 comments on the RCRA amend-
ments, Congress states that it had "not sought to define
'knowing' for offenses under section 3008(d) - that process
has been left to the courts under general principles." S. Rep.
No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5019, 5038.
Certain crimes require not only the intent to act, but also
the intent to violate the law. This interpretation was followed
by the Third Circuit in United States v. Johnson & Towers,
Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208
(1985). In Johnson & Towers, the defendants were charged
with unlawful disposal of hazardous waste without a permit
under RCRA § 3008(d)(2). This section applies to: "any per-
son who . . . (2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any
hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter -
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(A) without having obtained a permit under [section 3005] of
this title ... or (B) in knowing violation of any material con-
dition or requirement of such permit." RCRA § 3008(d)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).
The government argued that "knowingly" applies only to
"treats, stores, or disposes" of any hazardous waste, and that
it did not have to show the defendant knew either that the
waste was hazardous or that there was no permit. Johnson &
Towers, 741 F.2d at 667. The court noted, however, that
"purely as a verbal matter, the word 'knowingly'... may nat-
urally be read to modify the entire remainder of the clause in
which it appears." Id. at 669 (quoting United States v. Mar-
vin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1081 (1983)). The court held that all elements of the offense
must be shown to have been knowing. Id. AcCordingly, the
jury must find: 1) the defendant knowingly disposed of the
waste; 2) that defendants knew a permit was required; and 3)
the defendants knew no permit was required. Johnson &
Towers, 741 F.2d at 669.
It must be noted that although the court in Johnson &
Towers called for the showing of specific intent, it lessened
the burden on the government by holding that an inference
could be made that; 1) a permit was required, and 2) the de-
fendant knew he did not have a permit. Here, the court relied
on language from United States v. International Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565, ("Where... dangerous.., or
obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of reg-
ulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in pos-
session of them must. be presumed to be aware of the
regulation.").
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, it is a felony offense when a per-
son "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsi-
fies, . . ., or makes any false,... statements or representations,
or makes ... any false writing . . . knowing the same to con-
tain any false ... statement." 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The Supreme
Court, in United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984), ruled
that no specific intent to deceive the government was required
("no actual knowledge that false statements were made in a
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matter within the federal agency jurisdiction" was necessary).
To establish a violation of section 1001, the Court held that
the government must prove that the statement was made with
knowledge of its falsity. Id.
Applying the above analysis of intent to RCRA §
3008(d)(3), it appears that the government must show that
the defendants:
- knew the false statements were made;
- knew that they were false;
- knew that they were included in a report; and
- knew that the report was used for purposes of compli-
ance with regulations promulgated by the EPA.
Alternatively, the Government must state that the defendant
knew the statements were filed in a report required by a gov-
ernment agency. United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm'n,
466 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
Defendants can argue that if "knowingly" was the only
mental element required under RCRA § 3008(d)(3), it carries
a lighter burden of proof than 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which re-
quires "knowingly" and "willfully." This would seem inconsis-
tent, as well as unfair, because section 3008(d)(3) imposes a
stiffer penalty than section 1001.
The government could argue that it was Congress' intent
to make section 3008(d) a public welfare statute and that the
only reason "knowingly" was added was to prevent a felony
conviction for an innocent or accidental false statement. As
such, a lighter burden of proof is required and nothing more
than knowledge of the false statements must be proved.
On the other hand, defendants can argue that the statute
is ambiguous, and that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes . . .be resolved in favor of lenity" toward
the defendant. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 77,
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 408 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
B. Whether Canner is responsible for the violation?
1. Overview
Canner has been convicted of knowingly making false
statements to the EPA in relation to a spill of the hazardous
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waste DWE from one of the company's trucks. The letter sent
by Durden to Canner was routed to Barker, his subordinate.
Barker then questioned his subordinate, Adams, and warned
Adams to say as little as possible to EPA inspectors when he
called them.
Canner admits that the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine does apply to this case, but claims that it does not apply
to him. Analysis must therefore focus on the degree of knowl-
edge required to hold Canner responsible for the false state-
ment. This will involve use of the framework provided by the
United States Supreme Court in Dotterweich and Park, dis-
cussed below.
Particular factors that should be analyzed may be found
in cases involving the responsible corporate officer doctrine in
other statutes, or in cases where criminal liability has been
imposed under RCRA. Thus, the issue is whether criminal
conviction under section 3008(d)(3) may be upheld, given the
degree of "knowledge" that Canner possessed in this case.
Canner's liability can be pursued on either a direct par-
ticipation or a vicarious liability theory. The question for Can-
ner's charge is whether Canner can delegate his responsibility
and liability. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), im-
plies the contrary, but in that case the president of the com-
pany knew of earlier violations of the same nature as those
charged against him. Here Canner was not aware of any
violations.
The mixed signals sent out by Canner are also relevant.
For instance, his repeated emphasis on profits above all else is
not consistent with his environmental compliance policy. Has
he in fact instructed his employees how to handle inquiries
like this? If he has explicitly or implicitly told his employees
to make incomplete and misleading reports to government
agents, his liability is more justifiable than if he instructed
them to respond completely and accurately.
2. Responsible corporate officer doctrine
a. Can Canner delegate his responsibility?
Criminal liability for "responsible corporate officer[s]" is
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explicitly contained within the Clean Air Act (CAA) §
113(c)(3), and the Clean Water Act (CWA) § 309(c)(6), but
neither section explains the degree of knowledge required for
conviction of responsible corporate officers for acts of subordi-
nates. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) § 14(b)(4), following the common law concept of
respondeat superior, explicitly makes officers responsible for
the acts, omissions or failures of their employees.
The criminal penalty provisions found in RCRA §
3008(d) do not mention "responsible corporate officers." Can-
ner and Barker have been convicted as "persons" who "know-
ingly" made false material statements for purposes of compli-
ance with RCRA regulations, in violation of section
3008(d)(3). The defendants argue that they are not the in-
tended targets of the criminal provision, because they did not
themselves make the false statement.
There are no cases directly on point involving criminal li-
ability of corporate officers under RCRA section
3008(d)(3), although there are cases that have addressed the
issue under related statutes.
Since, the RCRA criminal provisions have been amended
a number of times since their enactment in 1976 (amended in
1978, 1980 and 1984), the defendants may argue that Congress
deliberately left out the responsible corporate officer language
found in other environmental statutes because it did not in-
tend to impose liability on corporate officers.
The second point in favor of the defendants is that statu-
tory provisions imposing criminal liability should be con-
strued narrowly. The rationale follows a general policy that
the serious implications of criminal sanctions on defendants
necessitate a strict and narrow interpretation of the intended
targets of the statute. See United States v. Harris, 177 U.S. at
309; and as the Court stated in United States v. Dotterweich:
intention of a penal statute must be found in the lan-
guage actually used, interpreted according to its fair and
obvious meaning. It is not permitted to courts, in this
class of cases, to attribute inadvertence or oversight to
the legislature when enumerating the classes of persons
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who are subjected to a penal enactment, nor to depart
from the settled meaning of words or phrases in order to
bring persons not named or distinctly described within
the supposed purpose of the statute.
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 277.
Thus, since RCRA does not contain the language that
Congress felt was explicitly required in the CAA, CWA and
FIFRA, or the more stringent requirement of "willful" viola-
tion found in Toxic Substances Control Act, the defendants
argue that the responsible corporate officer doctrine does not
apply in RCRA.
The defendants' third argument is that the legislative his-
tory does not directly indicate an intention to impose such lia-
bility on corporate officers. The legislative history hints that
criminal penalties should be imposed only when the defend-
ant actually knows of the violation. For example, the House
Report stated that criminal penalties are appropriate when
there is a "willful violation of a statute which seriously harms
human health." H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt.
1, at 30, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6238, 6268. This statement would seem to support the defend-
ants' position that an officer without knowledge should not be
considered to have "willfully" violated the criminal provisions.
In both United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943),
and United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the Court up-
held the conviction of a corporate officer who claimed he did
not have "knowledge" of the violation under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938. In the absence
of explicit language, the U.S. Supreme Court has established
that Congress may impose criminal liability upon corporate
officers based on evidence "sufficient to warrant a finding ...
that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corpo-
ration, responsibility and authority either to prevent .. .or
promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he
failed to do so." Park, 421 U.S. at 671.
The Court first looked to the purposes of the statute in-
volved to determine if it may be interpreted as "dispens[ing]
with the conventional requirement for criminal con-
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duct-awareness of some wrongdoing." Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
at 280-81. Thus, an intensive analysis of the legislative history
of RCRA, particularly the criminal penalty provision of sec-
tion 3008(d), is required. If a similar purpose can be found in
RCRA, the Supreme Court's analysis in Dotterweich and Park
will be applicable to the case at bar.
At least one case analyzing RCRA has held that its pur-
poses are analogous to those of FDCA. See United States v.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989)(citing United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 ("RCRA's purposes, like those
of the Food and Drug Act, 'touch phases of the lives and
health of people which, in the circumstances of modern indus-
trialism, are largely beyond self-protection' ")).
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Johnson & Tow-
ers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1208 (1985), considered the purpose of RCRA and section
3008(d) to determine whether the criminal penalty provisions
could apply to a foreman and service manager employed by a
hazardous waste generator charged with disposal of hazardous
wastes without a permit. Id. at 664. The corporation pleaded
guilty to the charges, but the employees pleaded not guilty
and moved to dismiss the charges on the basis that section
3008(d) applied only to "owners and operators" of facilities.
Id.
The government argued for a more literal interpretation;
that section 3008 applies to "any person who .. . (2) know-
ingly treats, stores or disposes of any hazardous waste identi-
fied or listed under this subchapter at a facility which does
not have a permit [under 33 U.S.C. § 6928(d)]" or in violation
of a permit. 741 F.2d at 666.
The defendants argued that section 3008 was merely a
mechanism for enforcement against persons who come within
the permitting requirements of section 3005 (owners and op-
erators of treatment, storage and disposal facilities) and fail to
comply. Id. The defendants further argued that the addition
of "responsible corporate officer" to the Clean Air Act and the
Clean Water Act definitions of "person" supported a more re-
strictive reading of RCRA's definition. Id. at note 3.
Nevertheless, the court, citing United States v. Dot-
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terweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282, stated that "an exercise of drafts-
manship intended to broaden the scope of a criminal provi-
sion 'can hardly be found ground for relieving from such
liability the individual agents of the corporation.' "Johnson &
Towers, 741 F.2d at 667. The court concluded that the plain
language of the statute did not support either interpretation,
but that the broad definition of "person" in RCRA § 1003(15)
applied to section 3008 and included individuals. Id. They
held that "section [3008(d)(2)(A)] covers employees as well as
owners and operators of the facility who knowingly treat,
store, or dispose of any hazardous waste. However, employees
can be subject to criminal prosecution only if they knew or
should have known that there had been no compliance with
the permit requirement of section 6925." Id. at 666.
b. Can Canner avoid liability by willful ignorance?
The strongest argument in favor of the government lies in
the doctrine of willful blindness. This concept has been ap-
plied to extend the definition of the term "knowing" in
RCRA. Reporting on H.R. 2867, the legislation which eventu-
ally became the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of
1984 (HSWA), the House Judiciary Committee stated that
"the term 'knowing' includes the concept of 'willful blindness'
... so that it will not be possible for someone to avoid crimi-
nal responsibility by deliberately remaining ignorant about
the material conditions and requirements of permits." H.R.
Rep. No. 98, Pt. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5644. In United States v.
Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956
(1980), the court charged the jury with the following instruc-
tion: "The element of knowledge may be satisfied by infer-
ences drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately closed
his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to you
.... [A] defendant's knowledge may be inferred from a willful
blindness to the existence of the fact." Id. at 642. This princi-
ple may form the basis of an argument by the government
that Canner and Barker refused to take notice of the reported
leak from one of their trucks, or that they refused to alert the
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EPA when they knew that this information might have been
helpful to their investigation.
The government's argument for imposition of criminal li-
ability upon Canner and Barker is supported by the legislative
history of RCRA's criminal provision. During passage of the
1984 HSWA amendments, the committee report stated that
"knowing," as it is used in section 3008(d)(2)(B) & (C), "in-
cludes the concept of willful blindness, see H.R. Rep. 96-1396,
at 35-36, so that it will not be possible for someone to avoid
criminal responsibility by deliberately remaining ignorant
about the material conditions and requirements of permits."
H.R. Rep. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 3, at 8-9 re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS AT 5643-44.
Investigation of H.R. Rep. 96-1396 indicates that the
committee was concerned about "the case of the actor who is
aware of the probable existence of a material fact but does not
satisfy himself that it does not in fact exist." H.R. Rep. 96-
1396 (quoting Model Penal Code Section 2.02, Comment at
129-30 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955)).
Thus, it is a question of fact whether Canner and Barker
attempted to isolate themselves from the problem and delib-
erately did not investigate in order to avoid criminal liability.
Considering Canner's actions, it would appear obvious that
Canner was shielding himself from knowledge of the problem
at hand.
Brian Henderberg
David M. Moore
Michael G. Sterthous
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